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I. PRIOR ACTS AS EVIDENCE OF COMMON PLAN OR SCHEME TO 
CORROBORATE YOUNG VICTIMS' TESTIMONY 
In the district court, the State convicted Mr. Parmer of violating a criminal statute that 
protects a specific age group, to which none of the other prior acts witnesses belong. However, 
the State provided little in its Response Brief explaining why the age differences are not 
important. Instead, the State focused primarily on its need for the testimony to corroborate that 
of 14-year-old K.R., even though the district court rejected corroboration as a basis for admitting 
the testimony. The State's argument for the testimony on the basis of corroboration did not 
explain how the testimony was corroborative evidence of a common scheme or plan. 
The State cited State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 (1991), for the proposition 
that one of the exceptions to the general prohibition of prior acts evidence is to corroborate the 
testimony of minor child victims in sex cases. However, that proposition is broader than the 
actual holding in Moore and fails to give account to this Court's cautionary guidance in that case 
and later in State v. Tolman, 12 1 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992). 
In Moore, this Court explained clearly how the prior acts evidence in that case 
demonstrated a common scheme or plan and how it corroborates the young witness's testimony: 
The testimony demonstrates Moore's general plan to exploit and 
sexually abuse an identifiable group of young female victims. The 
testimony by Moore's daughter, stepdaughter and that of his 
granddaughter, the victim, reveals a continuing series of alleged 
similar sexual encounters directed at the young female children 
living within his household. 
120 Idaho at 746, 819 P.2d at 1146 (emphasis added). More specifically, this Court explained 
the similarity of the witnesses' testimony as such: 
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In the instant case the incidents of sexual abuse occurred at 
approximately the same age for each girl in the household. The 
defendant's daughter suffered the abuse by Moore beginning in 
1969, when she was nine years old, and it continued into 1973. 
The stepdaughter was eight years old when the abuse began in 
1979 and continued until some time in 1981. The alleged abuse of 
the defendant's granddaughter began when she was seven years of 
age, and is alleged to have occurred between February, 1984 and 
May, 1985. 
Id. at 748, 819 P.2d at 1148. 
The similarity of the facts in Moore stand in stark contrast to the dissimilarity of the facts 
in this case. Here, Mr. Parmer stood trial before a jury that heard seven prior acts witnesses, of 
ages up to 50, complain that he had wronged them in one way or another, over a period spanning 
nearly 20 years, and among the wronged were those complaining that he had brought out in them 
carnal desires, human desires, for which even though they were adults, they could not own for 
themselves. 
The State asserts in its brief that the one thing all the prior act witnesses had in common 
was that Mr. Parmer was the one who initiated the contact. State's Response Brief, p. 8. While 
that assertion may be true, it is not relevant to the inquiry at hand. What is relevant is whether 
Mr. Parmer initiated unwelcomed sexual contact in each instance. When understood in this way, 
the testimony of Mrs. Provence stands out since she testified that there was no sexual contact 
between herself and Mr. Parmer, whether welcomed or unwelcomed. 
The contact in question had to be unwelcomed sexual contact; otherwise, it was irrelevant 
to the issues being tried before the jury. And at least some of the instances testified to where the 
contact was sexual were consensual. In those circumstances, it was irrelevant who initiated the 
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sexual contact because it was consented to, whether explicitly or implicitly. It is human 
experience that sexuallsensual contact is often consented to non-verbally and the human 
condition is such that there is communication subtle in its form that invites the contact. This is 
likely the situation with one or more of the witnesses who had consensual contact with 
Mr. Parmer. As such, each of the circumstances where the contact was either non-sexual or 
sexual but welcomed was substantially dissimilar to that complained of by K.R. and should not 
have been admitted under the rubric of corroborative evidence of a common scheme or plan. 
The admission of the State's adult prior acts testimony does not comport with this Court's 
guidance in Moore and Tolrnan. The lesson from those two cases is that where special issues of 
proof arise due to the alleged victim's tender age, prior acts evidence may be used to show a 
common scheme or plan in order to corroborate the alleged victim's testimony only where 
sufficient similarities exist between the prior acts and the acts alleged in the charge. The 
similarity is only sufficient when incidents of sexual misconduct are tlie same or similar aid they 
are targeted at the same or similar victims. Otherwise, such evidence does not tend to 
corroborate a child victim's testimony. Instead, it only serves to prejudice the jury against the 
defendant by convincing them that he is in fact a bad man. 
This Court warned in Tolman that it was not sufficient to simply place all prior bad acts 
involving sexual misconduct under the rubric of corroborative evidence of a common scheme or 
plan: "We do not suggest today that any and all evidence of prior sexual misconduct is 
admissible in sex crime cases merely by placing it under the rubric of corroborative evidence of a 
common scheme or plan." Id. at 905, 828 P.2d at 13 10. 
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Additionally, before prior sexual misconduct evidence is admitted to corroborate the 
testimony of the alleged victim, there should be some reason to believe there are special proof 
issues present due to the age of the alleged victim. That is, it would be inappropriate to admit 
such evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony without there being some reason to believe 
that the victim was immature, unable to clearly communicate, or was of such a tender age that 
the jury would discount the child's testimony. Here, there was no reason to believe that to be the 
situation, since the alleged victim was articulate and able to testify quite clearly and concisely. 
In summary, the State's response argument is largely conclusory and neglects to set forth 
why the evidence is relevant to common scheme or plan, or how the common scheme or plan 
corroborates K.R.'s testimony. This Court has set forth specific features that must be present 
before such evidence can be admitted to show common scheme or plan, and the State has not 
demonstrated that the prior acts evidence had these features. See Parmer Brief, p. 3 1. There is 
also no attempt by the State in its response to address the disparity in ages as it impacts the 
analysis of whether K.R. was part of the "targeted group" - that is, the State does not address the 
trial court's understanding that the evidence actually showed that Mr. Parmer was not targeting 
minor females but rather was targeting adult females. 
11. INTENT AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE BAR ON PRIOR ACTS EVIDENCE 
The State has largely failed to address whether the district court properly weighed the 
probative value of the prior acts testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice. For example, 
the State has not responded to Mr. Parmer's argument that the presence of Ms. Cleveland in the 
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courtroom as a spectator during the first trial should have been a factor the district court 
considered in its balancing analysis. 
Instead, the State argued in its Response Brief that the evidence was relevant to 
demonstrate intent as an exception to the general rule barring prior acts evidence. However, if 
I the State's position were the law, prior acts evidence would he admissible in every case where 
intent is an element of the crime. Under that rule, anytime a sex case is brought the State would 
he permitted to introduce prior acts evidence irrespective of whether the prior acts were similar 
I to those charged by the State in the prosecution. i 
111. PILINGON EVIDENCE 
1 The State argued that a curative instruction fiom the district court was sufficient to 
protect Mr. Parmer from the prejudice of the presentation of seven adult prior acts witnesses. 
State's Response Brief, p. 9. But a curative instruction to the jury can only go so far to avoid 
prejudicing the defendant when there are so many 404(b) witnesses. A piling-on conccm arises 
in such a case and that should have been a factor the district court considered in its Rule 403 
analysis but did not do. While Mr. Parmer addressed this issue extensively in his brief, the State 
has largely failed to address the question of why it was necessary to admit so many Rule 404(b) 
witnesses. 
Similarly, the State did not address Mr. Parmer's argument that such piling-on of 
cumulative prior acts evidence is fundamentally unfair since it eventually becomes 
overwhelming in its relevance and runs the significant danger of relieving the State of its burden 
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. With the admission of so many prior acts witnesses 
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testifying to circumstances dissimilar to those alleged in the charge, the trial was not a fair trial 
as it is doubtful whether it can be surmised that Mr. Parmer was convicted for having actually 
touched the one lone 14-year-old girl where and how it was claimed, as opposed to the jury 
merely finding him guilty of not being innocent in the biblical sense of that word. 
IV. OTHER ISSUES RAISED IN MR. PARMER'S BRIEF AND NOT ADDRESSED 
IN THE STATE'S RESPONSE 
The State failed to address Mr. Parmer's argument that the district court inappropriately 
limited the time for the defense to investigate the prior acts witnesses before the hearings on the 
State's motions in limine where much of the time then available was being eaten up by the 
change in attorneys and preparing for trial. 
The State also sidestepped Mr. Parmer's argument that the district court should have 
denied the motions in limine because the State failed to meet its burden. Irrespective of the 
objections made by defense counsel below, if the State did not meet its burden, the burden was 
not met and the motion in limine should have been denied. 
Finally, the State made no attempt in its Response Brief to address Mr. Parmer's 
arguments relating to fundamental error and cumulative error. 
V. IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO SUSTAIN 
THE STATE'S OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONING RELATING TO 
MR. PARMER'S INTERVIEW BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
It seems the State has fundamentally misunderstood Mr. Parmer's argument relating to 
whether it was error for the district court to sustain the State's objections to questions related to 
law enforcement's interview of Mr. Parmer immediately after the confrontation call. Mr. Parmer 
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argued that the court's exclusion of any questions and answers relating to the interview with 
Officer Gilbert was error because (1) Rule 106 permits the introduction of specific portions of 
the recording, and (2) the hearsay rule excludes such evidence from the ban on hearsay. 
Especially relating to the hearsay rule issue, the district court erred in finding the hearsay rule 
bars the use of such evidence. 
Also, the State's attempt to re-frame Mr. Parmer's argument as though the defense is 
claiming it incumbent upon the State to "admit" the tape simply misses the point. Mr. Parmer's 
argument is that the evidence should have been admitted when the defense attempted to present 
it and the State objected. Mr. Parmer's position is that the district court erred by sustaining the 
State's objections on the basis that the evidence was hearsay when in fact, under the Rules of 
Evidence, such evidence falls within one of the expressed exceptions to the bar on hearsay. 
Further, it is an unusual suggestion made by the State that Mr. Parmer's position is that 
the State was obligated to introduce the audiotape of the interview. That position taken by the 
State fails to recognize that it is not the State that admits evidence at trial. It is the district court 
that performs that function. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While normally the introduction of inadmissible testimony will not deny a defendant a 
fundamental right, it should be recognized that the dangers of Rule 404(b) evidence are 
multiplied many fold when the flood gates are opened and every man, woman and child comes 
forth to air their grievances, bearing testimony of the defendant's many sins, his every wrong, 
big and small, every slight, and every moral failing that he has over a lifetime acquired, 
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irrespective of whether his wrongs bear any real relation to one another, that human nature being 
what it is, a jury of human beings will convict him, even if the charged crime is not proven, of 
being a bad man. At some point a defendant is denied the most fundamental right of our 
criminal justice system, which is to be presumed innocent of the charge until such time as the 
prosecutor proves otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.' Here, Mr. Parmer stood trial before a 
jury that heard seven prior acts witnesses of ages up to 50, complain that he had wronged them in 
one way or another, over a period spanning nearly 20 years, and among the wronged were those 
complaining that he had brought out in them carnal desires, human desires, for which, even 
though they were adults, they could not own for themselves. A fair trial was not had and it is 
doubtful whether it can be surmised that Mr. Parmer was convicted for having actually touched 
the one lone 14-year-old girl where and how it was claimed as opposed to being found guilty of 
not being innocent in the biblical sense of that word. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of November, 2008. 
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC 
DARWIN L. OVERSON 
ANorney~~ for Appellant 
I See State v. Anderson, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (Idaho 2007). 
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